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Objectives  
The main objectives of this work were to study and ascertain the significance of digi-
tal platforms as market mediators, and to investigate how platform environments im-
pact the relevant stakeholder groups, these being businesses, consumers and regu-
lators. A final, separately outlined objective was to identify and comment on any risks 
and/or controversies which may arise as a result of increased platform diffusion, 
adoption and generalisation. This process is described in the thesis as platformiza-
tion for short. The study describes contemporary issues in international business, but 
on a broader level it is also set in the context of digitalization and its changing of the 
social landscape. 
Summary  
The study outlines digital platforms as a new, innovative hybrid-concept. Platforms 
exist simultaneously as digital infrastructure, business models and market spaces. 
These market spaces are heavily characterized by network effects and massive 
economies of scale. As business models, platforms impose a new economic para-
digm which is delineated by winner-take-all potential, open-sourced value chains and 
the heavy emphasis of technology and data. For companies platforms entail increas-
ing competition, which is disruptive to some and lucrative for others. For consumers 
platforms offer novel products and services, but also less quantifiable benefits such 
as social gain. A variety of concerns, such as data privacy and negative consumer 
outcomes from network effects manifest on the flipside. For public institutions plat-
forms constitute uncharted territory with regards to regulation. Issues concerning 
governance revolve around fair competition and misuse of monopolistic power. 
Conclusions 
The changes brought forth by platformization, economic and social, are gargantuan 
new developments that cannot be wholly described as ‘good’ or ‘bad’; instead, they 
function to alter the socio-economic reality of many, and in so doing function as a 
new ‘norm’ of sorts. For the time being, studies would suggest that the public values 
the benefits digital platforms grant access to over potential drawbacks. For busi-
nesses, however, the coming years entail turbulent times as platform dynamics con-
tinue to proliferate markets. The pressure to enact legislation to curb the power of the 
most dominant platform businesses rises amidst rallying fears of the misuse of plat-
form power, rendering the future uncertain. 
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Part I 
Introduction 
 
 
The annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland had a strikingly grandilo-
quent official theme for its meeting in 2019: “Globalization 4.0: Shaping a Global Ar-
chitecture in the Age of the Fourth Industrial Revolution” (Schenker, 2019). While the 
Fourth Industrial Revolution certainly sounds like an impactful phenomenon, it is likely 
that the origins and meaning of this title would largely escape the layman. What, then, 
is meant by this elusive revolution supposedly taking place all around us?  
To elaborate, the 2019 discussions in Davos revolved around one binding issue: the 
impact of novel technology on business and society. Sub-topics and panels contem-
plated themes such as digital disruption, the dominance of tech industries, the future 
of work, e-commerce, data privacy and appropriate governance for digital environ-
ments. Interestingly, there is one topic that embodies all of these themes into one con-
cept, which has also been frustratingly underrepresented in recent public discourse: 
digital platforms and their reshaping of the economic landscape. 
 
Significance of the Research 
In this research document I seek to combine multiple perspectives on a topic which is 
rarely receiving of a cross-disciplinary approach. Digital platforms, emergent from ad-
vancements in information communications technology, are far too often only viewed 
merely as technological curiosities among the broader public. In academia we see this 
lack of perspective repeat itself; whether it be with the study of organizational science 
or a business case on how companies succeed in e-commerce markets, the founda-
tional significance of digital platforms as market mediators remains unaddressed. This 
academic blind spot has led to a situation where businesspeople are usually ahead of 
the curve when compared to scholars and regulators. This observation is not exclusive 
to the World Economic Forum discussions, for in my own platform research I discov-
ered corporate documents by companies such as McKinsey, KPMG, Accenture and 
Oxera to be of unrivalled value from time to time. 
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Research Design 
The broader research questions this thesis is built on are as follows: 
RQ1: What are the distinguishing elements of a platform-based business model? 
RQ2: How does the emergence of digital platform ecosystems impact the stakeholder 
dynamics of traditional markets? 
RQ3: What risks or controversies can be identified with increased reliance on plat-
forms? 
The objectives I pursue with these research questions are: 
1. To outline a conceptual framework of the platform ecosystem & comment on its 
significance 
2. To conduct stakeholder analysis in assessing the changes brought forth by the plat-
form model – perspectives studied include businesses, consumers & regulators 
3. To explore how the shift towards platform-based economies drives social change 
Part I of the thesis will here forth comprise a methodology section followed by a review 
of the theoretical background and literature of the topic. This review will introduce the 
relevant concepts and technologies and cover scholarly consensus on the origins and 
significance of digital platforms from a business perspective. In doing so Part I will 
focus on answering Research Question 1 and accomplishing the first objective. 
Part II of the thesis is dedicated to stakeholder analysis of the implications digital plat-
forms have on different market actors. This thesis considers three perspectives: that 
of businesses, consumers and regulators. Part II is split in this manner in order to de-
termine what effects the established ‘platformization’ of markets has on different in-
terest groups and how these effects may differ among one another. The final Discus-
sion section will summarize the findings and comment on the changes brought forth by 
platformization. The summary will seek to apply the Stakeholder Analysis observations 
to a broader socio-economic context where the benefits and benefactors, as well as 
risks, controversies and byproducts of platformization may be identified. In doing so 
Part II focuses on answering Research Questions 2 & 3 and likewise accommodates 
Objectives 2 & 3. 
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Methodology 
This thesis utilizes primarily qualitative means to study the research problem at hand. 
More specifically, the chosen methodological approach was to conduct secondary re-
search, i.e. desk research. The objective here, then, was to review and combine pre-
vious findings in order to make new and meaningful observations. The primary sources 
for information gathering include academic journals, articles, books and institutionary 
reports. Some corporate publications, such as commercial surveys, are also cited. 
These serve to bring a quantitative angle to the research as well as providing for more 
empiricism in general. For example, in Part II Section 1.2: Forms of platform participa-
tion, a survey of more than 1600 U.S. enterprises by Bughin, Catlin & Dietz (2019) of 
McKinsey & Co. provides valuable data regarding the prevalence of platform-adoption. 
 
Ethics and Reliability 
When referring to secondary sources (e.g. to the aforementioned surveys), the findings 
of others are not merely regurgitated, but instead contextualized to support the analysis 
and conclusions made in the research proper. This approach serves as a guiding prin-
ciple which extends to the whole thesis, as is pertinent to the ethics of desk research. 
Reliability control is admittedly less straightforward than with quantitative methods, but 
nonetheless an important consideration. The chosen sources have been carefully se-
lected to cover a diverse set of perspectives on the subject matter. Individual takes on 
the topic may range between theoretical and empirical, informative and commercial, or 
critical and welcoming. No single source is relied upon in excess. Each source is also 
analytically scrutinized, compared, and contrasted; this is particularly the case for more 
contested ideas, or ones that repose in the fringes of academia. Any biases, such as 
commercial ones in the corporate material, or partisan arguments in favour of certain 
stakeholders, are identified and mitigated to the best of the author’s ability. 
 
Reasoning 
The reasons for choosing the methodological approach detailed above are manifold. 
Primarily, it was clear from the beginning that this project would encompass cross-
disciplinary research on new, partially uncharted topics. Indeed, the work combines 
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knowledge and elements of conventional business studies, economics, information 
technology, organizational study and sociology. The idea here was to compound the 
work of pioneering platform researchers such as Michael Cusumano, Annabelle 
Gawer, Geoffrey Parker, Marshall van Alstyne and Sangeet Choudary with other, com-
plementary viewpoints in order to build a bigger picture.  
As mentioned earlier, platforms are often viewed from a markedly in-field vista (such 
as in tech), which is limiting for a topic that is so impactful in many contexts. As is 
already evident from the research questions, which include the study of platforms, their 
many stakeholders and the risks associated, it is unlikely that the objectives here could 
have been pursued adequately with quantitative methods at an undergraduate level. 
The approach chosen is therefore suitable and justified; few such pieces of work have 
been written up to date. These circumstances also served as the original spur for the 
author’s initiative to choose this topic in the first place - and in so doing to hopefully 
illuminate a space which has thus far been somewhat of an academic blind spot. 
 
Literature Review 
 
1. Digitalization as a Prelude to Platforms 
 
1.1 Epilogue 
A defining megatrend in 21st century business discourse has been the impact of digi-
talization on markets. Digitalization is often conflated with the term digitization, which 
refers to the straightforward transformation of data from analogue to digital form 
(Bloomberg, 2018). Digitalization, however, captures a broader range of meanings as 
the process in which digital technologies prevail, alter business models and provide 
new value-producing opportunities (Gartner, n.d.). 
The systemic changes brought forth by this phenomena are often described by schol-
ars as digital disruption (Skog, Wimelius & Sandberg, 2018), since its consequences 
are said to erode contemporary approaches, boundaries and processes that may have 
served as the traditional foundation for value capture within the given market (Karimi 
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& Walter, 2015). Digital disruption as a concept, however, is often framed in a partisan 
context since it is addressed primarily from the perspective of legacy businesses which 
are the targets of said disruption. Skog, Wimelius & Sandberg (2018) combine several 
scholarly perspectives to offer the following, exhaustive definition of digital disruption: 
“The rapidly unfolding processes through which digital innovation comes to fundamen-
tally alter historically sustainable logics for value creation and capture by unbundling 
and recombining linkages among resources or generating new ones.” 
Digital innovation, therefore, is at the very core of introducing this dynamic. Yoo, Hen-
fridsson & Lyytinen (2010) purport that digital innovation can be examined as product 
innovation, which is often the subject of Information System Research (IS), or process 
innovation, which is more commonly studied in Information Technology (IT) spheres. 
Product innovation is defined as carrying out of new combinations of digital and phys-
ical components to produce novel products (Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyytinen, 2010). 
Meanwhile, process innovation breaks down business operations to processes and 
seeks to apply innovations to key processes (Davenport, 1992).  
What, however, drives digital innovation? According to existing IS research, digital in-
novation in both products & processes is expedited by new technology (Yoo, Hen-
fridsson & Lyytinen, 2010; Moore & Tambini, 2018). Some innovations [technologies] 
may span both product and process developments; digital platforms, for instance, 
can be identified as an industry disruptor on many fronts (Karimi & Walter, 2015). 
 
1.2 ‘This time it’s different?’ 
Markets have always been responding to entrant technology, and certainly have not 
remained static over time. Before moving on the question of why digitalization is per-
ceived as an entirely new paradigm must therefore be addressed. Barrett et. al (2015) 
argue that digital innovation has become the major driving force for [all] social and 
business innovation in the 21st century. Rapid technological advances during the past 
decade in areas such as mobile solutions, social media, digital platforms, cloud com-
puting and the Internet of Things have allowed for radical, completely novel products 
and services to emerge (Hyvönen, 2018).  Moreover, within just 1-2 decades these 
‘novel’ products and services, as well as particularly their providers, have risen to 
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constitute the most valuable industries in the world (Moore & Tambini, 2018; Zysman 
& Kenney, 2015). 
In order to understand this transformation, one must establish what makes digital tech-
nologies different from their predecessors. Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyytinen (2010) outline 
three distinctive characteristics of digital technologies. These are: 
1. reprogrammability,  
2. the homogenization of data, and  
3. the self-referential nature of digital technology 
Reprogrammability refers to a digital device’s ability to execute a multitude of different 
functions, and that these functions can be reprogrammed (altered) at any time. The 
significance of this is that the features and value delivery mechanisms of digital offer-
ings can be updated, developed and optimized after their initial launch (Nambisan et 
al, 2017). 
The homogenization of data means that any content (for instance audio, video, trans-
actions) “can be stored, transmitted, processed, and displayed using the same digital 
devices and networks, thus separating the content from the medium” (Hyvönen, 2018). 
The effect of this is that innovations are inexpensive and benefit vastly from swift scal-
ing effects, as almost all devices can access any given content. 
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of digital technologies-in terms of explaining 
the rapid onset and success of digitalization-is the self-referential nature of digital tech-
nology. This quality asserts that the spread of digital innovations accelerates the use 
of digital technologies [in business & industry], which in turn fosters more digital inno-
vation. This leads to the creation of a positive virtuous cycle where digital technologies 
have lower entry barriers, decreased learning costs and accelerated diffusion rates 
(Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyytinen, 2010). In practise this leads to the “increased creation 
and availability of digital devices, networks, services, and contents” (Benkler, 2006 in 
Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyytinen, 2010). In layman’s terms, therefore, the theoretical 
framework posits that digitalization only leads to more digitalization. A self-sustaining, 
exponential process is therefore initiated as the cycle is set in motion. 
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2. Digital Platforms 
 
2.1 Platforms as a concept & business model 
Digital platforms, as examined earlier, are a prime example of digital innovation (Skog, 
Wimelius & Sandberg, 2018). While digital platforms are manifest in a number of novel 
products and services, the idea of platforms is more of a concept than it is any specific, 
tangible piece of technology. Indeed, the variety of platforms almost defies their cate-
gorisation (Zysman & Kenney, 2015). A working definition of digital platforms can be 
suggested as: 
 “a technology-enabled business model that creates value by facilitating ex-
changes between two or more interdependent groups” (Morvan, Hintermann & 
Vazirani, 2016), 
or alternatively: 
“frameworks that permit collaborators – users, peers, providers -- to undertake 
a range of activities, often creating de facto standards, forming entire ecosys-
tems for value creation and capture,” (Zysman & Kenney, 2015). 
A common denominator for both definitions is that platforms are understood as a 
means of facilitating transactions between two or more groups. Commonly these 
groups are end-users and producers (Morvan, Hintermann & Vazirani, 2016), but more 
specifically may include e.g. developers, advertisers, entrepreneurs & employees 
(Markus & Loebbecke, 2013).  
Another crucial point is value creation; Hagiu (2013) underlines the concept of network 
effects as the source of platform value creation/capture. Network effects are said to 
occur when the intrinsic value of a given product or service increases as its user base 
grows (Reddy, 2018). Examples of value creation through network effects include e.g. 
a larger marketplace, or alternatively the increased creation of complementary goods 
& services [by 3rd parties] which add to the original platform/business. 
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2.2 Platform technology 
Exhibit 1: The Layered Architecture of Digital Technology (Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyyt-
inen, 2010) 
 
Farrell & Weiser (2003) 
identify four different layers 
of digital technology: the 
content layer, application 
layer, logical layer and the 
physical layer. Yoo, Hen-
fridsson & Lyytinen (2010) 
have refined these ideas to 
extrapolate a hierarchical 
four-layer model for digital 
technology, which includes 
the content layer, service 
layer, network layer and de-
vice layer (Exhibit 1). 
 
The device layer, which is further sub-divided into the logical and physical components, 
consists of all appliances capable of interacting with digital content (hardware) as well 
as e.g. their operating systems (logical capability). The network layer includes artefacts 
of physical connectivity (e.g. cables) as well as internet access standards. The service 
layer constitutes the sphere of different applications and services available through the 
network, and finally, the contents layer includes all the data these services and appli-
cations host. The Layered Architecture of Digital Technology model is useful in provid-
ing insight to the diversity of platforms; indeed, examples of platform-utilizing technol-
ogies can be identified in each layer of this framework. 
1. Device layer (logical capability): operating systems 
2. Network layer: the World Wide Web (Zysman & Kenney, 2016) 
3. Service layer: software-as-a-service (SaaS), search engines 
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4. Contents layer: data storage, infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) 
Each of these digital technologies facilitate 3rd party interaction and leverage net-
work effects for value, which therefore validates their categorization as platforms 
(Hagiu & Wright, 2015; Zysman & Kenney, 2016). In summary: the physical compo-
nents of platforms are algorithms, hardware, software and service modules (Hender-
son & Clark, 1990 in Kim, 2015) but for the purposes of this thesis digital platforms will 
be understood more broadly as the infrastructure and rules for a marketplace (as per 
van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016), which then meet the established criteria. 
 
2.3 Cloud Computing 
Cloud computing refers to digital technology “…enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources that 
can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction,” (NIST, 2011). Examples of these computing resources include 
servers, networks, applications and services. A less technical definition of cloud com-
puting has been summarized by Vaquero et al. (2008) as “a large pool of easily usable 
and accessible virtualized resources.”  
The reason cloud computing is significant with regards to the scope of this thesis, how-
ever, is because it has largely facilitated the mass-adoption of the platform business 
model. The shift from computing as a hardware and capital investment-heavy software 
product to a “location independent and highly scalable service that is acquired on de-
mand” (Bayrak, Conley & Wilkie, 2011) has enabled the rapid diffusion of novel digital 
services. Through cloud computing, firms are effectively able to ‘rent’ computing power 
from service providers on a pay-on-demand basis (Bayrak, Conley & Wilkie, 2011), 
and then use it for their own commercial purposes, primarily new product offerings. 
Some scholars have, therefore, described cloud computing as a new general purpose 
technology (Etro, 2012), which is a term used to describe a “new method of producing 
and inventing that is important enough to have a protracted aggregate impact,” (Jo-
vanovic & Rousseau, 2005). 
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2.4 Cloud Computing Service Models & Platforms 
Cloud computing technology is generally categorized to three types of service models 
(NIST, 2011). These are: 
1) Software-as-a-service, SaaS 
2) Platform-as-a-service, PaaS 
3) Infrastructure-as-a-service, IaaS 
Software-as-a-service (SaaS) refers to a creator offering customers the pay-on-de-
mand use of their applications which run on a cloud infrastructure. This underlying 
infrastructure may be owned by software creator or provided for by a 3rd party. The 
PaaS and IaaS service models are more developed with regards to facilitating multi-
sided platform activity. Platforms-as-a-service extend to users the opportunity to host 
their own digital creations and applications on the provider’s cloud, to the extent which 
these are technically compatible. The users do not control the underlying cloud infra-
structure, such as storage, networks or servers, but retain control and limited configu-
ration ability of their own contributions (NIST, 2011). Finally, the sophisticated IaaS 
model provides the users with a pool of fundamental computing resources such as 
processing power, networks and storage (NIST, 2011), which then allow the users to 
execute and run their own software. The user still does not manage the underlying 
cloud infrastructure, but exercises increased independence through control of e.g. op-
erating systems and storage (NIST, 2011). 
With reference to the Layered Architecture of Digital Technology (Exhibit 1; Yoo, Hen-
fridsson & Lyytinen, 2011), the following can be surmised of the extant cloud computing 
service models: 
• Software-as-a-service pertains to technology belonging to the Service Layer 
• Platform-as-a-service enables its consumers to develop, host and deploy Ser-
vice Layer content on the service provider’s Contents Layer infrastructure 
• Infrastructure-as-a-service provides its consumers with the capability of creating 
novel Contents Layer innovations through outsourced computing resources, 
which can then be hosted on the service provider’s cloud infrastructure 
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3. Platform Organization 
 
3.1 The Platform Ecosystem 
The rise in utilization of the platform business model and associated digital technolo-
gies have led to the emergence of a novel economic framework: the platform ecosys-
tem. Merriam-Webster defines an ecosystem as: 
“something (such as a network of businesses) considered to resemble an ecological 
ecosystem especially because of its complex interdependent parts.” 
As platforms continue to expand, create, disrupt, and form a complex network of affili-
ates, scholars have likened this new environment to the development of an organic 
ecosystem. In this context, the essence of platforms has been explained as “…the 
collection of solutions by the access channels or interfaces related to the problems of 
the entities belonging to an ecosystem,” (Iansiti & Levien in Kim, 2015). While business 
ecosystems have been written about before (e.g. Schumpeter, 1942), scholarly con-
sensus would distinguish that digital platforms are at the heart of this novel ecosystem, 
particularly in the ITC industry. Evans, Schlamensee & Hagiu (2006) describe the plat-
form ecosystem as consisting of “mutually dependent business communities and con-
sumers who have a complementary and symbiotic relationship with the platform”. 
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Exhibit 2: Conceptual framework of the platform ecosystem structure (Author) 
 
As the centrepiece of the model, the role of an [innovation] platform is to allow “…other 
participants within an ecosystem to build complementary goods, services, or technol-
ogies based on an integrated foundation of goods services, and technologies,” (Gawer 
& Cusumano, 2013). Exhibit 2 illustrates this complementary nature of goods/services 
built by 3rd party actors (service providers) by using elliptical subsections for each layer 
or the structure. Ecosystem affiliate service providers provide services to customers, 
while platform providers administer the integrated foundation Gawer & Cusumano 
(2013) refer to, which is often hosted on a cloud infrastructure.  Moreover, entire plat-
forms may also complement one another. Such is the case e.g. for AirBnB and Amazon 
Webservices, which is why the platform providers are also shown as interdependent 
elements. Together all the pictured entities constitute a simple yet descriptive model 
of the ecosystem itself, the unitary nature of which is indicated by the final ellipses. 
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3.2 How does the Ecosystem work? 
An ecosystem requires a high degree of synergy to function. For this it relies heavily 
on data and “…the platforms or technologies that support interconnection, such as 
service-oriented architectures and cloud computing,” (Markus & Loebbecke, 2013). 
Examining the organizing logic of an ecosystem, Miles et al. (2009) describe the con-
cept of an Innovation form organization (I-form for short): a system which is character-
ized by constant innovation through inter-firm knowledge sharing and collaboration. 
The model also underpins the role of one organizational unit as the facilitator of this 
collaboration, a role which is fulfilled by providing the necessary infrastructure and de-
veloping strategic initiatives for the community to prosper. “By not having responsibility 
for administration and growth, member firms of the I-form organization can focus on 
forming the temporary collaborative networks needed to generate product and market 
innovations,” (Miles et al, 2009). Albeit this theory largely predates modern digital plat-
forms, the parallels between the functions of an I-form organization and those of a 
platform ecosystem are striking. Referring to Figure 2 for comparisons: 
1. The service category constitutes products and market innovations 
2. The service provider is a collaborative member of the I-form organization 
3. The platform provider is the facilitator, host to the digital infrastructure at the 
core of the system 
Criticisms of applying the I-form model to a platform ecosystem without reservations 
have also been put forth; for instance, it has been argued that instead of being a strictly 
collaborative community, the platform provider within an ecosystem corresponds to a 
managerial role while platform affiliates are more comparable to employees (Yonatany, 
2020). Yonatany further argues that “knowledge of the highest significance flows in the 
form of directions given by the platform provider to its respective affiliates” instead of 
knowledge flowing freely as theorized in the I-form model. Alternatively, Markus & 
Loebbecke (2013) have put forth the concept of business communities, which com-
prise an even larger unit structure. These are represented by the cross-section of ac-
tors spanning an entire industry and may often include several interacting platforms. 
Nevertheless, scholarly consensus seems to agree on central/leading role of the digital 
platform in these organizational units. 
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4. The Emergence of Platform-based Economies 
 
4.1 Introduction 
So, what effects have these new means of technological value capture had with re-
gards to the global business environment? According to scholars and businesspeople 
alike, global markets are shifting towards increased platform utilization and reliance 
(Srnicek, 2017; Zysman & Kenney, 2016). In real terms this means that the share of 
economic activity being facilitated by & transacted within platforms is ever-growing. 
Although the exact size of this market is immensely difficult to ascertain due to scope 
variables and lack of exhaustive data, contemporary research has offered estimates 
such as 4.3$ trillion (Evans & Gawer, 2016) or 7.2$ trillion (KPMG research cited in 
Consultancy.org, 2018). To put these massive figures into perspective, the market cap 
of the entire Standard & Poor’s 500 stock index, which tracks 500 of the largest U.S. 
businesses, was 28.1$ trillion as of December 2019 (Yahoo Finance, 2020). 
The previous section established the platform ecosystem as the framework in which 
digital platforms are manifest within the economy at large. But where, in real terms, are 
these ecosystems located, which industries do they span and who are the relevant 
stakeholders? The final section of this literature review will attempt to identify and de-
scribe the concept of a platform economy. 
 
4.2 Platforms as a Phenomenon 
“A digital platform economy is emerging,” (Zysman & Kenney, 2016). Academics, in 
contrast to engineers and businesspeople, have arguably struggled to keep up with 
the rapid pace of platform diffusion. Indeed, seven of the ten globally most valuable 
firms now utilize a platform business model (Schenker, 2019), yet profuse literature on 
the topic has only recently been forthcoming. Exhibit 3 reveals that Microsoft alone has 
managed to stay at the forefront of value creation, while the other gargantuan con-
glomerates of yesteryear have been all but ousted by new platform-leveraging enter-
prises. 
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Exhibit 3: Ten most valuable companies by market cap in 2018 versus 2008 (Schenker, 
2019) 
        *employs platform business  
The origin story of digital platforms lays in the ICT-driven services transformation which 
emerged alongside the internet (Zysman & Kenney, 2016). Today, however, few in-
dustries untouched by digitalization remain. Consequentially, digital platforms have 
also permeated all manner of different industries. Popular examples of business-to-
consumer platforms include Uber (transportation) and AirBnB (accommodation), while 
IBM Watson (AI) and Salesforce (consultancy) are prominent business-to-business ex-
amples. When one factors in cloud computing, it can be asserted with confidence that 
the majority of businesses with any kind of digital presence today come into contact 
with platforms. 
In a platform economy, the value added “depends on the extensiveness and function-
ing of the network,” (Dufva et al, 2017) as discussed earlier in relation to network ef-
fects. Scholars have thereby argued that companies should now embrace platform-
leveraging strategies in order to not be left out of these vast value chains, or face ex-
tinction (Parker, Van Alstyne & Choudary, 2016). Despite these pressures to adapt, 
the future of the recently upstart platform-based economies is currently uncertain 
(Dufva et al, 2017). Zysman & Kenney (2016) share this view: they argue that while 
platforms are driving unprecedented change, “the exact nature of that change will be 
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determined by the social, political, and business choices we make.” As of yet, the future 
relationship between private, public and regulatory actors in the platform business re-
mains unclear (Dufva et al, 2017). 
___________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part II 
Stakeholder Analysis 
As already briefed upon in the literature review section, the impact of digital platforms 
on business-as-usual is immense. Platform dynamics are proliferating all manner of 
traditional industries, often with disruptive consequences, unprecedented externalities, 
but also a plethora of new opportunities. The focus in Part II is to identify and evaluate 
specific phenomena and the ramifications platformizing environments pose to busi-
nesses, consumers and regulators. The final discussion will recap the key observations 
and present an overview of the new stakeholder dynamics in platformized environ-
ments. 
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1. Businesses & Platforms 
 
1.1 Strategic framework 
A fundamental assumption is that a majority of companies will eventually be exposed 
to digital platforms. This naturally gives firms cause to establish their own strategic 
alignment with regards to platform-driven change in some manner, even if the chosen 
policy is to disregard them for the time being. Vasquez Sampere (2016) emphasizes 
that platforms create new opportunities for companies by “…circumventing traditional 
business rules,” (Korhonen et. al, 2017). This is a rather assured perspective, as it is 
equally evident that firms whose core competencies are grounded in said traditional 
business rules would likely view these opportunities as threats instead. Regardless of 
differing views, companies seemingly have three baseline strategic options to consider 
with regards to platformization (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019). These can be identified 
as: 
1. Developing one’s own platform technology & business model 
2. Entering an existing platform ecosystem as an affiliate 
3. Ignoring digital platforms & discarding the platform business model as unsuitable 
 
McKinsey study on platform adoption in different industries 
A recent study of 1600 businesses (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019; Exhibit 4) divided 
respondents into two categories: digital natives and incumbents. Here digital natives 
denote businesses that were founded on the basis of digital technology (primarily IT 
companies), while incumbents are legacy businesses which have entered digital mar-
kets at a later stage. The findings of the study offer insight on the scale and nature of 
platformization in different industries. As shown in Exhibit 4, businesses native to digital 
technology are far more likely to leverage platform strategies (Options 1 & 2 as outlined 
earlier) with only 5% opting out (Option 3) compared to the incumbents’ 16%. Incum-
bent businesses are also only half as likely to own their platform when compared to 
digital natives. Nevertheless, the extent of platformization in legacy businesses is also 
major. The study notes that platforms are “no longer the domain solely of digital 
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natives” (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019) and highlights companies such as Nike, Daimler 
and Unilever as examples of traditional businesses who have ventured to create their 
own platform.  
A final key discovery of the study notes that the prevalence of platforms within a given 
industry correlates strongly with its extent of digitalization. For example, only 55% of 
respondents in the healthcare & pharmaceuticals sector leveraged platform strategies 
whereas 95% of those in the consumer banking sector did so (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 
2019). 
 
Exhibit 4: Survey results for platform strategy: (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz for McKinsey, 
2019) 
 
 
1.2 Forms of platform participation – why the high number of affiliates? 
On the aggregate level, studies would indicate that incorporating any kind of platform-
leveraging strategy is preferable over choosing to opt out (Morvan, Hintermann & 
Vazirani, 2016; Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019). However, engaging with platforms is 
certainly not a risk-free endeavour either. Struggling to optimize monetization, attempt-
ing to platformize a business that is inherently too low margin to succeed or failing to 
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establish trust are some of the common stumbling blocks businesses face in crafting 
their platform strategy (Eastwood, 2019). 
Returning to the industry study by McKinsey (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019), it is no 
surprise that the most common platform strategy for incumbents and digital natives 
alike was cooperation with a 3rd party platform. Despite industry hype, the number of 
successful platforms is relatively low (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019). Of the com-
mercially successful platforms that do exist, Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie found the 
overwhelming majority to be transactional in nature. This means that the platform fa-
cilitates transactions between multiple market actors, but does not accommodate for 
others to build, expand or otherwise create new product offerings the platform archi-
tecture, which is characteristic to innovation platforms. “Creating an innovation platform 
is…difficult. This entails platform entrepreneurs introducing a technology that other 
firms will adopt as core to their business and then build products and services around” 
(Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019). Operating systems are a good example of the 
monopolistic dynamic of innovation platforms: the world has only one dominant soft-
ware platform for PCs – Windows – and two for smartphones – iOs and Android (Cusu-
mano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019). It also goes without saying that introducing this kind of 
technology is expensive – the cost structure of digital platforms generally includes high 
fixed costs, particularly in relation to research & development (Duch-Brown, 2017). 
 
1.3 Evaluating becoming a platform affiliate 
As concluded above, most global companies decide to participate on platforms as an 
affiliate, i.e. they manage a presence in the chosen ecosystem without a stake in the 
ownership of the platform. Many find a 3rd-party solution attractive because it offers 
quick access to the platform business’ userbase (Reinartz, Wiegand & Wichmann, 
2017) with little to no immediately apparent trade-off. Another prompt benefit is that 
firms may capitalize on the economies of scale and network effects of the ecosystem 
with marginal-if any-responsibility of the high fixed costs associated with maintaining 
the platform infrastructure (Duch-Brown, 2017). These advantages may be particularly 
desirable for smaller businesses who otherwise struggle to gain visibility in the market 
(Reinartz, Wiegand & Wichmann, 2017). However, large businesses with their own 
independent platforms may also become affiliates. In these cases, the company 
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platform becomes interlinked with an even larger platform ecosystem, which typically 
unlocks access to an array of complimentary features (Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019). 
Indeed, the McKinsey study by Bughin, Catlin & Dietz (2019) concluded that the firms 
who initially chose to deploy their own platforms were highly likely to collaborate with 
broad industry-wide platform ecosystems at a later stage. 
Just as with any other platform strategy, opting for a 3rd party solution has its own 
complications and controversies. The pricing structure of many platform models is of-
ten characterized by the practise of price discrimination towards consumers, affiliates 
or both (Jeon, Kim & Menicucci, 2015). This leads to situations where different affiliates 
are charged different rates for their participation. Beyond claims of unfairness, this 
convention essentially means that the share of value capture available to affiliates de-
pends on their bargaining power within the ecosystem (Duch-Brown, 2017). As an ex-
ample of this dynamic, Amazon charges the professional sellers on its retail platform 
for margins from 8% up to 17%, depending on the product category being sold 
(Reinartz, Wiegand & Wichmann, 2017). Considering that due to network effects the 
platform owner is incentivized to accumulate as much affiliates as possible (Reinartz, 
Wiegand & Wichmann, 2017) a conflict of interest can be extrapolated. Arguably, a 
large pool of affiliates subject to intense competition for value share serves to reduce 
the bargaining power of individual actors (Duch-Brown, 2017). 
 
1.4 Competition in a platformizing environment 
Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary (2016) describe the competitive implications of plat-
form diffusion as “seismic”, not only in traditional marketplaces but also between com-
peting platform businesses. Porter’s foundational ideas of analysing competition 
through the Five Forces model become somewhat limited and hard to apply in a plat-
form environment (van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016).  It is no surprise, then, that 
legacy companies have proven themselves vulnerable in responding to the rapid emer-
gence of platforms, which is why they are now looking to execute their own platform 
plays (as evident in Bughin, Catlin & Dietz, 2019). For historical perspective, in the 20th 
century it took American companies in traditional industries such as steel and heavy 
machinery decades to outcompete their dominant rivals in Great Britain and Germany 
(van Alstyne, Parker, Choudary, 2016). Today, it may take only a few years for a 
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platform upstart such as Uber or Alibaba to seriously challenge the market-leading 
incumbents. Bhadrawaj et al. (2013) have outlined four different themes for businesses 
to consider when adapting their competitive strategy for the digital [platform] era; these 
are scope, speed, scale and sources of value creation & capture. In this section these 
factors will be discussed from a platform-centric perspective, and further developed to 
provide analysis on how platforms change the nature of competition. 
The scope of business pertains to a company’s ability to leverage digital resources, in 
this case the company platform, in order to expand into new markets (Hyvönen, 2018). 
An example of this would be Amazon’s initiatives with Amazon Web Services, which 
was the underlying digital infrastructure used to support subsequent services such as 
Amazon Kindle and Prime Video (Hyvönen, 2018). Here Amazon utilized their AWS 
computing platform to enter new markets, namely those for e-book retail and streaming 
services (Hyvönen, 2018).  Returning to the digital hierarchy architecture model by 
Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyytinen (2011; Part I Section 2.1), Amazon’s strategy can be de-
scribed as having first established itself on the service layer with the AWS offering, and 
then expanding vertically to other layers with novel offerings (Hyvönen, 2018) such as 
Kindle Readers (device layer) and Prime Video Originals (content layer). 
Platforms enable companies to capture the element of speed to the benefit of their 
competitive advantage (Bhadrawaj et al, 2013). As explored earlier in Part I Section 
1.2, digital innovations, such as the platform infrastructure, are comparatively faster to 
manage since their contents are separated from their medium (homogenization of 
data) and the product offerings can be updated after launch as a consequence of re-
programmability (Yoo, Henfridsson & Lyytinen, 2011). This means that the platform 
itself can be maintained, updated, reengineered and developed in a timelier manner 
than physical pipeline infrastructures, which is understood by scholars as the traditional 
way of organizing business activity (van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). Platforms 
also promote speed by providing for shorter transitionary periods in finding new parties 
to interact with (OECD, 2019), given that the relevant partners are available on the 
same ecosystem. Somewhat similar to a subset of the platform ecosystem model (au-
thor), Exhibit 5 (Reinartz, Wiegand & Wichmann, 2019) demonstrates how these speed 
[efficiency] gains play out on a digital retail platform vs. a typical retail supply chain. 
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Exhibit 5: Interaction on a digital platform vs. traditional [pipeline] supply chain 
(Reinartz, Wiegand, Wichmann, 2017) 
 
The next strategically significant way platforms force changes to the traditional com-
petitive landscape is through new opportunities in business scaling. As explained ear-
lier, digital innovations are rapid to scale, but what exactly drives these scaling effects 
in the context of digital platforms? In ‘The Platform Business Model & Strategy’, Kim 
(2015) argues that platforms facilitate open value chains whereas traditionally they 
have been tied to strictly internal processes. In other words, this means that platform 
companies may benefit from access to other market actors and their assets when cre-
ating and operating their value chains, i.e. the business activities that go into trans-
forming input to output (Jurevicius, 2013). An illustrative example of this would be a 
retail platform commissioning computing resources from a cloud computing service 
provider. This allows for scalability on an otherwise unattainable magnitude. Indeed, 
open-sourced value chains answer the question as to why the world’s largest accom-
modation provider (AirBnB) does not own a single hotel room, why the world’s most 
popular taxi company (Uber) owns no cars (Reinartz, Wiegand & Wichmann, 2017), or 
how a leading retailer such as Alibaba survives without any inventory or warehouses 
(van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). 
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1.5 How do companies monetize platforms? 
Finally, platforms offer new sources of value capture as per Bhadrawaj et al. (2013). 
Where does this value reside and how is it captured? Returning to the foundation of 
how platforms work, it is evident that the network effects unlocked within a given eco-
system constitute the most significant value to platform participants (van Alstyne, Par-
ker & Choudary, 2016), not necessarily the preceding new technologies themselves. 
The crucial question for companies operating a platform, then, is how to monetize the 
platform business model in such a way that charges users for the benefits that they 
extract from the network but is simultaneously conducive of its rapid and effortless 
expansion. Ironically, capitalizing on the positive feedback loop which breeds network 
effects is often counterproductive to the process itself in many ways: charging users 
for platform access may cause people to avoid the platform altogether; charging based 
on usage can limit peoples frequency and duration of engagement; finally, charging 
based on content launched would likely discourage creativity and innovation (van 
Alstyne, Parker & Choudary, 2016). Nonetheless, a profitable business model is as 
necessary from a business perspective as in any other industry. Van Alstyne, Parker 
& Choudary (2016) have therefore argued that “…monetization is […] one of the most 
difficult – and fascinating issues that any platform company must address.” 
Intuitively, it would seem that a strong catalyst for success is to postpone profit-driven 
monetization efforts until a critical mass (Morvan, Hintermann & Vazirani, 2016) of plat-
form users has been accumulated. This logic is supported by a number of successful 
real world examples as well; for instance, the market leading digital payment platform 
PayPal “practically ‘bought’ their own user base” (Posthumus & Samsom, 2018) by 
subsidizing new users with 10$ for signing up and offering another 10$ for every refer-
ral. Although this expensive customer acquisition strategy is certainly not sustainable 
in the long term, it succeeded in achieving the critical mass of users for the PayPal 
platform. Today, new users do not register because of a 10$ subsidy [which was dis-
continued] but because they gain access to the platform’s established network of mil-
lions of retailers and customers (Posthumus & Samsom, 2018). Almost as if a sequitur 
to the perspective by Parker, van Alstyne & Choudary (2016) outlined earlier, Posthu-
mus and Samsom (2018) conclude that the ‘golden rule of platforms’ is “users first, 
monetization second”. 
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The appropriate monetization strategy for a platform business model depends essen-
tially on the type of platform a company operates; as established earlier, platforms can 
be extremely diverse. Here we will return to the simple separation of transactional plat-
forms and innovation platforms (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019). For innovation 
platforms (e.g. operating systems, SaaS models), which often reside entirely in digital 
space, the role of data as the centerpiece of monetization efforts is enhanced. In this 
context data is understood as any information, commercial or otherwise, which is con-
tained in and extracted from a platform ecosystem. According to data-driven value 
chain researchers Marconi, Larocca & Visconti (2017), “three current IT trends are en-
abling businesses to achieve the previously elusive goal of data monetization”. These 
are big data, business analytics and cloud computing, all of which share a close con-
nection to digital platform technology.  
Companies who operate an innovation platform can capitalize on the data generated 
within their ecosystems in a number of different approaches. These include but are not 
limited to: 
1. Leveraging data for internal operations (strictly proprietary approach) 
2. Licensing proprietary data to select clients on a pay-on-demand basis 
3. Trading data for mutual benefits 
4. Leveraging proprietary data for advertising opportunities 
5. Selling premium data products, e.g. data subscriptions 
6. Sharing data freely among all stakeholders for maximum network effect expe-
dience 
(Walker, 2015 in Marconi, Larocca & Visconti, 2017) 
For transactional platforms, the focus of commercialization lies more in the exchange 
of goods and services, which follow traditional monetization guidelines. These product 
offerings can still be digital (e.g. Spotify, Salesforce), but accommodate physical prod-
uct offerings (e.g. Uber, AirBnB) as well. 
 
1.6 Winner-take-all dynamics 
If the industrial revolution was centered around the factory assembly line, similarly the 
new age of digitalization can be embodied in the digital platform (Cusumano, Gawer & 
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Yoffie, 2019). Yet just as during and after the industrial revolution, heated social and 
economic debate has risen over whether these modern industrialists (the platform own-
ers) wield an unhealthy degree of power and influence (Zysman & Kenney, 2016). 
Many scholars in different fields have debated the issue of whether platform economies 
are inherently oriented towards winner-take-all markets, and if so, why this is the case. 
A winner-take-all market is generally understood as a business environment where the 
best performers claim close to all of the benefits, leaving very little for other actors 
(Kenton, 2018). The controversy of winner-take-all markets revolves around their ten-
dency to drive increased wealth dispersal; some get it all while others get nothing. 
Intuitively, it is not hard to see this dynamic play out in the contemporary platform econ-
omy, where a select few tech companies and their platforms demonstrably dominate 
global markets (see Exhibit 3; Schenker, 2019). This section will not seek to comment 
on whether or not platform economies are strictly winner-take-all markets, but rather 
explore why these characteristics are so endemic to the platform discussion. 
 
1.7 Capturing the market 
The notion of winner-take-all markets, albeit contested, appears very lucrative to busi-
nesses with platform ambitions. According to Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie (2019), some 
businesses are willing to haemorrhage lots of money in the beginning because they 
are convinced that “at the end of the road, there’s going to be a winner-taket-all market” 
waiting for them. As detailed earlier, the share of platforms that evolve into large com-
mercial success stories is low (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019), yet when platforms 
do succeed, they make for tremendous returns. Often the winners may grow into seem-
ingly invincible corporate goliaths that can do as they please. In this regard, empirical 
evidence would support the winner-take-all argument: it is all but too easy to distinguish 
several such winners (Moore & Tambini, 2018): Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon 
and so on. 
The theoretical argument as to why the platform model is conducive of winner-take-all 
phenomenon is, once again, tied to network effects (Kim, 2015). Considering the case 
of YouTube, for instance, it is evident that the video-sharing platform was the first of 
its kind to achieve the critical mass of users shortly after 2005. Initial users and content 
creators attracted more users, which then increased the attractivity of the platform 
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sufficiently for network effects to take hold (Kim, 2015). Thereafter, the likelihood of a 
competing business repeating this success diminishes as the original network grows 
(Sun & Tse, 2007), particularly if the market conditions are such where consumers do 
not adopt more than one platform for accessing similar content. 
 
1.8 Value within the Ecosystem 
“The reality is that the winners and losers in markets depend on who can participate 
and on what terms” (Zysman & Kenney, 2016). This much is clear, but what of the 
power dynamic inside platform ecosystems – how is the value shared? From a data-
centric perspective, extant information system research explains that even though all 
stakeholders within a digital network participate in value creation through data, the 
monetary reward for doing so is more evident to the companies managing it (Marconi, 
Larocca & Visconti, 2017). This can be applied to mean that although all platform eco-
system members create value, their participation in terms of proprietorship and mone-
tization is limited. Unsurprisingly, several real-world examples support this conclusion; 
Facebook, for instance, does not own or create the content on its platform, but none-
theless reaps the majority benefits of its monetization.  
 
2. Platforms and the Public 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Just as platforms are changing the way companies conduct business, they are also 
altering the socio-economic standing of ordinary citizens; as consumers of platform-
sourced goods and services, as the audience of platform marketing and monetization 
efforts, as members of vast information networks or even as employees and entrepre-
neurs of platform businesses. In the study of economics, the theoretical background 
posits that consumers are net benefactors of platforms since these are said to increase 
competition and reduce costs in the market (Lee, 2012). Indeed, scholars have con-
ducted many studies where the results would support the existence of consumer sur-
plus-net aggregate benefit-in platform-mediated markets (Oxera, 2015). However, 
economic theory tends to be lamentably one-dimensional in its analysis: market 
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performance gains in favour of the consumer may be all but offset by other factors 
such as labour disruption or privacy concerns. Furthermore, what awaits the consumer 
when platforms become too dominant or monopolistic? Bearing these questions in 
mind, this section is dedicated to a more comprehensive analysis of the different per-
spectives on platforms & the common consumer. 
 
2.2 Consumer benefits 
First and foremost, platforms have provided consumers with entirely novel channels 
through which to consume (Wang, Ai & Zhong, 2019) – and more broadly, to transact. 
How, though, are these new channels ‘superior’ or at least different from traditional 
ones? As detailed above, consumers may benefit from platform market penetration 
through the knock-on effects of increased competition, which tend to drive a lower price 
level (Lee, 2012; van Alstyne, Parke & Choudary, 2016). Furthermore, this increased 
competition usually provides for greater product variety, an aspect that is also greatly 
valued by consumers (Lee, 2012; Wang, Ai & Zhong, 2019). What is unique to the 
platform channel, however, is the ease and efficiency of interaction which serves to 
decrease costs. Examples of such reduced costs to the consumer include: 
1) Search costs – the costs incurred in the process of finding the desired parties to 
interact with, and  
2) Transaction costs – any costs associated with the exchange of goods and services 
(Moore & Tambini, 2018; OECD, 2019). 
 
Oxera Business Study on Platforms & Consumer Value 
In 2015, Oxera Consulting conducted an insightful survey of over 6000 household re-
spondents in 4 countries (Germany, France, Spain, Poland); the idea was to identify 
and measure consumer perceptions of the benefits they gain from the usage of online 
platforms. According to Oxera, the limitation of a lot of the contemporary research on 
the subject is that it only examines the mechanisms of whether and how much con-
sumers benefit from platform use, but rarely delves into specifics regarding what fac-
tors the consumers themselves value the most. 
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Exhibit 6: Consumer perception of platform benefits (Oxera, 2015) 
 
The findings would indicate an overwhelmingly positive response, since 97% of re-
spondents identified at least one benefit they associate with platform use (Exhibit 6; 
Oxera, 2015). The most selected benefit categories were improved convenience, 
greater choice, increased transparency, higher engagement, monetary benefits and 
enhanced relationships, which were all relatively consistent across the studied nations. 
A key derivative observation is that a lot of these benefits (such as transparency, en-
hanced relationships) are rather intangible in nature, which further highlights a ‘blind 
spot’ of economic literature in this area.  
 
2.3 Platform size & consumer utility 
A crucial element of the theory on platforms and network effects would dictate that the 
value/benefits of platforms to consumers is directly correlated with the size of the plat-
form. This is due to the inter-dependence of the demand for a platform and the demand 
for the associated goods, services and applications (Iansiti & Zhu, 2015). Consider, for 
instance, a software platform: “Having more applications on… [the] platform leads to 
greater demand for that platform; at the same time, a larger installed base of consum-
ers leads to a larger supply of applications,” (Lee, 2015). The more participants, the 
larger the platform, and therefore the most value to customers it would seem (Brunier 
et. al, 2020). Aside from cost reduction and product variety, this conclusion is also 
supported by a utilitarian perspective, since the access to and availability of the asso-
ciated goods and services increases in tandem with the platform user base (Hagiu, 
Page 33 of 41 
 
2015). These specific network phenomena are often cited as ‘cross-side network ef-
fects’ or ‘indirect network effects’ by scholars (Hagiu, 2015). 
 
2.4 The Monopoly Dilemma: Winner-take-all from the Customer Perspective 
A central tenet of traditional economics is that monopolistic markets are characterized 
by several inefficiencies and disadvantages over more competitive ones. To the con-
sumer these include but are not limited to supply restrictions onto the market, higher 
pricing, reductions in consumer welfare and limitations in product and supplier choice 
(Economics Online, n.d.). Considering, then, the earlier section on Platform Size and 
Consumer Utility, an economic paradox becomes evident. In other words, if consumer 
value is maximized when a given platform is as large as possible, will it not eventually 
develop monopoly power, and consequentially hinder the former?  
A monopoly outcome gains support from researchers who subscribe to an expectation-
driven view of platform success (Iansiti & Zhu, 2015). In this school of thought and its 
associated modelling, consumers are taken to form rational expectations of a plat-
form’s future success (in terms of market share) and to adjust their behaviour accord-
ingly. Therefore, these scenarios often play out to create a monopoly equilibrium, 
where all consumers eventually accumulate on one platform (Iansiti & Zhu, 2015). A 
key observation of these models is that as would-be new platforms lack an established 
userbase, customers tend to side with the incumbent platform (Iansiti & Zhu, 2015). 
This cross-side network phenomenon makes it very difficult to dislodge existing mo-
nopolies (Moore & Tambini, 2018), and also implies an emphatic first mover ad-
vantage. According to some researchers, for consumers this means that “…a platform 
that has a small lead on both sides of the market […] could take over the entire market 
even if its quality is inferior to its rivals,” (various in Iansiti & Zhu, 2015).  
There is no clear-cut scholarly consensus on whether and when a monopoly outcome 
should be expected (Lee, 2015). Müller and Böhme (2014) have attempted to outline 
the market conditions in which a platform monopoly emerges, and those in which com-
peting platforms may coexist; they posit that conditions where  
1) platforms are homogenous 
2) consumers wish to use only one platform for one function, and 
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3) the cross-side network effects are strong and positive 
are conducive of a monopoly outcome. On the contrary, the likelihood of markets that 
do not exhibit these conditions to reach a monopoly equilibrium is “ambiguous” (Müller 
and Böhme, 2014). However, the authors make note that the absence of one or all of 
these factors alone does not rule out a platform monopoly either. Indeed, there are 
indicators that customer multi-homing (using many platforms for similar functions) is 
the strongest catalyst for platform competition (Moore & Tambini, 2018). In this regard, 
a stark conflict of interest between the platform owners and the platform users can be 
discerned. While most of the consumers on digital platforms practise and value multi-
homing (Oxera, 2015), the platform suppliers are often taking measures to lock in their 
userbase in order to counter this practise in their favour (van Alstyne, Parker & 
Choudary, 2016). 
 
3. Platforms and Society: A Regulatory Perspective 
 
3.1 The need for a regulatory framework 
This final stakeholder analysis section will discuss the relationship public institutions 
have with the process of platformization. It is evident that such a large change in mar-
kets will prompt a regulatory response (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019); the ques-
tion is, what kind of policies will be enacted and how will they shuffle the platform power 
dynamic. Up until very recently, platform owners have undoubtedly been “ahead of the 
curve”, meaning that they have been largely able to make up their own rules as they 
go. This owes to the exponential development and diffusion of digital technologies 
wherein the rest of society has been unable to keep up. With a dilemma between the 
untold opportunities posed by platforms and the socio-economic reverberations of plat-
formization becoming ever more apparent, regulators have gradually entered the in-
dustry frame with budding approaches Dufva et al. (2017). 
Moore & Tambini (2018) examine the ascendancy and power of the world’s largest 
platform companies in their book “Digital Dominance: The Power of Google, Amazon, 
Facebook and Apple.” They extrapolate that while the calls for tough regulations on 
platforms are sometimes confounded with partisan arguments from incumbents 
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seeking protection against their platform competitors, the regulatory measures cur-
rently in authorities’ disposal do seem outdated for a platform setting. Similarly, van 
Alstyne, Parker & Choudary (2016) produce an elaborate list of reasons why these 
markets should be regulated with a new approach they would dub ‘Regulation 2.0’. 
These include the rules of platform access and participation, pricing concerns, data 
privacy and ethics, national control of information assets, tax policy, labour regulation 
and the potential for misuse of power by the winner platform companies. Few concrete 
measures or specific policies have yet to be unearthed, but in recent developments the 
U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Department of Justice and Congress have began 
subjecting the largest platform companies (Google, Amazon, Facebook, Apple) to in-
creased anti-trust scrutiny (Chen, 2019). 
 
3.2 Case: The European Union & Digital Platforms 
According to the European Commission (2019), “…platforms are strong drivers of in-
novation and play an important role in Europe's digital society and economy. […] They 
increase consumer choice, improve efficiency and competitiveness of industry and can 
enhance civil participation in society.” It is also evident from the European Commis-
sion’s public communications that their regulatory interests have spiked in recent 
years. Their website [ec.europa.eu] lists several projects, legislative undertakings and 
investigations into topics also discussed in this thesis (digital platforms, the platform 
economy, cloud computing, data privacy), all of which have been launched in only re-
cent years.  
Despite presenting platforms in a primarily positive spotlight, the Commission does 
concede that: “The growing importance of the online platform economy raises new 
policy and regulatory challenges. In particular… [its] …potential cannot be fully ex-
ploited due to certain potentially harmful trading practices and a lack of effective re-
dress” (2018). The wording of Commission Decision of 26.4.2018 also discretely im-
plies that traditional tools such as Competition Law, Labour Law and Data Protection 
statutes (Strowel & Vergote, n.d.) have proven inadequate as regulatory tools for plat-
form environments, primarily due to the rapid pace of technological development. 
Some of the issues the European authorities outline as emerging in a problematic con-
text include “…algorithmic decision-making and ranking, data access and use, 
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remuneration of  material displayed online, business-to-business commercial relations 
in online advertising, alleged discriminatory practices of service providers vis-à-vis us-
ers and restrictions on users to offer different conditions on other distribution channels,” 
(European Commission, 2018). Unsurprisingly, most of these topics have also been 
brought forth in the earlier stakeholder analysis sections. To counter their shortcomings 
the EC has established its own Observatory on the Online Platform Economy. Although 
tasked only to observe, liaise, investigate and advise for the time being, it is entirely 
possible if not likely that the recommendations of this institution will see themselves 
become legislation in the near future. 
 
4. Conclusions & Discussion 
Digital platforms and the concept of the platform economy are perhaps the most sig-
nificant technological and economic advancements of the late decade. In ascertaining 
the impacts of digital platforms, two major themes become apparent throughout this 
thesis. The first of these deals with understanding the rapid breakthrough of digital 
platforms and their tremendous potential for new value creation and capture. Scholars 
and empirical evidence establish digital platforms as providing for grand opportunities 
with regards to novel products and services, efficiency, collaboration, technological 
innovation and market welfare – this much is clear. 
The second theme contemplates the dynamics of how platform value is shared, and 
with what consequences. A concern shared by many regarding the current trajectory 
of the platform power structure is that this new value, as detailed earlier, will primarily 
be enjoyed and administered by tech giants such as Amazon and Apple. Likewise, it 
remains unclear whether society will be able to make good on the opportunities of 
platformization or will it squander them. The situation has multiple levels to it: for in-
stance, a consumer who enjoys certain types of platform benefits may simultaneously 
suffer from platform-induced disruption at the workplace, or bear anxiety regarding how 
platform corporations manage and handle his/her data. 
In light of the findings presented in this thesis, it is fair to say that societies around the 
globe are at a crossroads regarding the future of platforms. According to most experts 
the platform steam engine will not stop here, but that the global share of economic 
activity being mediated by platforms will only continue to increase as larger and larger 
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ecosystems form by the day. The economic playing field will likely be completely rev-
olutionized, and the reader will live to see ever more innovative developments such as 
the mass-adoption of cloud computing solutions in daily life. As the process of plat-
formization surges forward, it is highly likely that the societal issues and other exter-
nalities discussed in this thesis will also intensify. Unless consumers, businesses and 
the public sector find some common ground in the form of an agenda for managing 
platformization, they risk a carte blanche scenario wherein the largest platform com-
panies can dictate the terms of the future marketplace. By the words of John Zysman 
and Martin Kenney (2016): “We are in the midst of a reorganization of our economy in 
which the platform owners are seemingly developing power that may be even more 
formidable than was that of the factory owners in the early industrial revolution.” 
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